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ENSURING THE CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT
IN TIMES OF CRISIS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
ONGOING DEBATE IN CONGRESS
By James C. Ho'

Last September, two days before the two-year anniversary of the
September 11 terrorist attacks on our Nation's homeland, Senator John
Cornyn, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights, convened the first in a
series of Senate Judiciary Committee hearings to examine potential
vulnerabilities in our constitutional system of government. That first
hearing focused on the real constitutional problems associated with
ensuring the continuity of Congress.' It was clear to many who observed
that hearing that a constitutional amendment is needed to truly
guarantee a functioning Congress in a time of crisis and ensure that the
American people will never have to endure a period of martial law as the
result of a terrorist attack.2
+ Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights,
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Senator John Cornyn, Chairman. This
article is based on remarks delivered at the January 28, 2004, Catholic University Law
Review Symposium entitled Ensuring the Continuity of Government in Times of Crisis.
The author would like to thank Senator John Cornyn, without whom this issue would not
be receiving the same public attention, and without whom this article would not have been
written. He would also like to thank Joshua M. Sandier for his research and assistance,
and Allyson N. Ho for her encouragement and advice. The views expressed here are
those of the author alone.
1. Ensuring the Continuity of the United States Government: The Congress: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter Congressional
Continuity Hearing], http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=909.
2. The hearing was held just a few months after the Continuity of Government
Commission issued its report unanimously endorsing a constitutional amendment to
address problems of continuity in the Congress. See CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N,
THE CONGRESS (2003), available at http://www.continuityofgovernment.org/pdfs/
FirstReport.pdf. The Continuity of Government Commission is a bipartisan, blue-ribbon
commission of distinguished former public servants, jointly sponsored by the American
Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution. Id. The commission's report has been
praised by The Washington Post, The Washington Times, and The Wall Street Journal. See,
e.g., Decapitating Congress, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2003, at A16; Ensuring Congressional
Continuity, WASH. TIMES, June 4,2003, at A20; Pale Orange, WASH. POST, May 24, 2003,
at A30. Senator Cornyn has written extensively on the need for a constitutional
amendment to ensure the continuity of congressional operations. See, e.g., John Cornyn,
Continuity of Congress, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2003, at A23; John Cornyn, A Republic, If
We Can Keep It, WSJ.COM OPINIONJOURNAL, Sept. 9, 2003, at http://www.opinionjournal.
com/extra/?id=110003985 [hereinafter Cornyn, A Republic]; John Cornyn, Congress Must
Pass a New Amendment to Ensure Continuity, ROLL CALL, May 12, 2004, LEXIS, News
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The Constitution vests Congressional power not in individual members
of Congress, but instead in the House of Representatives and the Senate
as institutions. Only both houses, working together as institutions, can
appropriate funds or enact legislation.3 Only• the
Senate, as a corporate
4
body, can consent to nominations or treaties. Moreover, such powers
can be exercised only in compliance with constitutional requirements.
Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution specifically requires a "Majority5
of each [house]" in order to "constitute a Quorum to do Business.,
Accordingly, without a majority of its membership, Congress cannot act.
What if United Airlines Flight 93 had struck the Capitol building on
September 11? And what if it had done so at the worst possible
moment-perhaps during a roll call vote, when virtually every member
of the House or Senate can be found on the floor of his or her respective
chambers? Under the Seventeenth Amendment, states may empower
their governors
to immediately appoint new senators in case of
• 6
vacancies, but the Constitution provides no immediate mechanism for
filling vacancies in the House. The only remedy available is the holding
of special elections 7-a process that takes several months to complete.
Or what if a majority of either the House or the Senate was not killed,
but was simply incapacitated-perhaps as the result of another, more
potent round of anthrax or ricin attacks? The problem could be even
worse in a situation of mass incapacitations than in the event of mass
vacancies, because the Constitution provides no remedy whatsoevernot even special elections-for redressing mass incapacitations in either
chamber of Congress. That means no functional Congress for a
potentially longer period of time. If a terrorist attack incapacitated, but
did not kill, enough members of Congress, the only constitutional means
of replacing them would be selecting new members at the next general
election. And because only one-third of the Senate at most can be
replenished at each biennial election, restoring a working Senate after a

Library, Rollcl File [hereinafter Cornyn, New Amendment]; John Cornyn, Let Each State
Decide How to Fill Vacancies, Address Incapacitation, ROLL CALL, Jan. 27, 2004, LEXIS,
News Library, Rollcl File [hereinafter Cornyn, Let Each Decide]; John Cornyn, Planning
for the Unthinkable,NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Nov. 5, 2003, at http://www.nationalreview.com/

comment/cornyn200311050737.asp [hereinafter Cornyn, The Unthinkable]. Senator
Cornyn has also praised the commission's work on the floor of the U.S. Senate on
numerous occasions. 150 CONG. REC. S8770 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Cornyn); 149 CONG. REC. S7275 (daily ed. June 4, 2003) (statement of Sen. Cornyn).
3. U.S. CONST. art I, §§ 1, 7, cl.
2, 8, cl.
1.
4. Id. art. II, § 2, cl.
2.
5. Id. art. I, § 5.
6. Id. amend. XVII.
7. Id. art. I, § 2, cl.
4.
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majority of senators has been incapacitated might take as long as four
8
years.
After that first hearing, Senators Cornyn and Trent Lott cochaired a
joint hearing of the Senate Judiciary and Rules Committees 9 on the
defects in the Presidential Succession Act. "
Fortunately, the
Constitution gives Congress ample authority to ensure the continuity of
the Presidency-even as it is inadequate with respect to congressional
continuity."
Unfortunately, the current Presidential Succession Act,
enacted in 1947,2 has long troubled the Nation's top legal scholars across
the political spectrum as both unconstitutional and unworkable.' 3 It is
disturbing how many scenarios we can imagine 4 in which we cannot
answer one simple question: Who is the President?'
In his introductory remarks at the hearing, Senator Cornyn recounted
a number of scenarios in which we cannot determine, with complete
certainty and beyond all legal doubt, who the President is. For example:
The President and Vice President are both killed. Under
current law, next in line to act as President is the Speaker of the
House. Suppose, however, that the Speaker is a member of the
party opposite the now-deceased President, and that the
Secretary of State, acting out of party loyalty, asserts a
competing claim to the Presidency. The Secretary argues that
members of Congress are legislators and, thus, are not
"officer[s]" who are constitutionally eligible to act as President.
8. See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2.
9. The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration has jurisdiction over
Presidential succession law. See AUTHORITY AND RULES OF SENATE COMMITTEES, S.
Doc. No. 108-6, R. XXV(1)(n)(1)(9) (2003), available at http://rules.senate.gov/senate
rules/menu.htm.
10. Ensuring the Continuity of the United States Government: The Presidency:Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciaryand the S. Comm. on Rules and Admin.. 108th Cong.
(2003) [hereinafter Presidency Hearing], http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?
id=914.
11. See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1, cl. 6; see also id. amends. XX, XXV.
12. Act of July 18, 1947, ch. 264, 61 Stat. 380. This statute was recodified as 3 U.S.C.
§ 19 in 1948. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 771, 62 Stat. 677. This Act is the third
major Presidential succession statute. The previous two were enacted in 1792 and 1886.
Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, §§ 9-10, 1 Stat. 239,240-4t; Act of Jan. 19, 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1.
13. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the PresidentialSuccession
Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1995); Steven G. Calabresi, The Political
Question of PresidentialSuccession, 48 STAN. L. REV. 155 (1995); M. Miller Baker, Fools,
Drunkards, & PresidentialSuccession, in THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, at http://www.fedsoc.org/Publications/Terrorism/presidentialsuccession.htm (2003).
14. See Presidency Hearing, supra note 10 (statement of Sen. John Cornyn),
http://judiciary.senate.gov/memberstatement.cfm?id=914&wit id=2047; see also John
Cornyn, Who's on First in the White House?, STAR-TELEGRAM.COM, Oct. 8, 2003, at
http://www.dfw.com/mld/dfw/news/opinion/6961377.htm.
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Believe it or not, the Secretary has a strong case -in fact, he can
cite for support the views of James Madison, the father of our
Constitution, who argued this very point in 1792, as well as legal
scholars on the left and right. Who is the President? Whose
orders should be followed by our armed forces, by our
intelligence agencies, and by our domestic law enforcement
bureaus? If lawsuits are filed, will courts take the case? How
long will they take to rule, how will they rule, and will their

rulings be respected?
Some might think and hope that in a moment of national tragedy, our
political leaders in Washington, D.C. would find a way to work together.
Remember, however, what happened following the assassination attempt
against President Ronald Reagan on March 30, 1981. At a nationallytelevised White House press conference, just hours after a bullet struck
President Reagan and threatened his life, Secretary of State Alexander
Haig took over the podium to tell reporters, much to the chagrin of
senior White House officials: "Constitutionally, you have the president,
the vice president and the secretary of state in that order ....As of now,

15. Presidency Hearing, supra note 10 (statement of Sen. John Cornyn),
http://judiciary.senate.gov/member-statement.cfmid=914&witid=2047
(alteration in
original) (citation omitted): see also Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton
(Feb. 21, 1792), in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 235-36 (Robert A. Rutland et al.
eds., 1983). Madison stated:
On another point the Bill certainly errs. It provides that in case of a double
vacancy, the Executive powers shall devolve on the Presidt. pro. tem. of the
Senate & he failing, on the Speaker of the House of Reps. The objections to this
arrangement are various. 1. It may be questioned whether these are officers, in
the constitutional sense. 2. If officers whether both could be introduced. 3. As
they are created by the Constitution, they would probably have been there
designated if contemplated for such a service, instead of being left to Legislative
selection. 4. Either they will retain their legislative stations, & and their
incompatible functions will be blended; or the incompatibility will supersede
those stations, & then those being the substratum of the adventitious functions,
these must also fail. The Constitution says, Congs. may declare what officers &c.
which seems to make it not an appointment or a translation; but an annexation of
one office or trust to another office.
Id.; see also 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1904 (1791).
Mr. Madison objected to the Chief Justice, as it would be blending the Judiciary

and Executive. He objected to the President pro tem. of the Senate.
Senator of some particular State, liable to be instructed by the State,
hold his office-thus he will hold two offices at once. He adverted
objections, which had been offered against the Secretary of State,
the compatibility of the two offices.

He will be a
and will still
to the other
and showed
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I am in control
here, in the White House, pending return of the vice
6
president.'
Senator Cornyn enumerated three other scenarios at the hearing:
[I]magine that, once again, the President and Vice President are
killed, and the Speaker is a member of the opposite party. This
time, however, the Speaker declines the opportunity to act as
President-in a public-minded effort to prevent a change in
party control of the White House as the result of a terrorist
attack. And imagine that the President pro tempore of the
Senate acts similarly. The Secretary of State thus becomes
Acting President. In subsequent weeks, however, the Secretary
takes a series of actions that upset the Speaker. The Speaker
responds by asserting his right under the statute to take over as
Acting President.
The Secretary counters that he cannot
constitutionally be removed from the White House by anyone
other than a President or Vice President, because under the
Constitution, he is entitled to act as President "until the
disability [of the President or Vice President] be removed, or a
President shall be elected." Confusion and litigation ensue.
Who is the President?
Or imagine that the President, Vice President, and Speaker
are all killed, along with numerous members of Congress-for
example, as the result of an attack during the State of the Union
address.
The remaining members of the House-a small
fraction of the entire membership, representing just a narrow
geographic region of the country and a narrow portion of the
ideological spectrum-claim that they can constitute a quorum,
and then attempt to elect a new Speaker. That new Speaker
then argues that he is Acting President. The Senate President
pro tempore and the Secretary of State each assert competing
claims that they are President. Who is the President?
Or finally, notice that the President, Vice President, Speaker,
Senate President pro tempore, and the members of the Cabinet
all live and work in the greater Washington, D.C. area. Now,
imagine how easy it would be for a catastrophic terrorist attack
on Washington to kill or incapacitate the entire line of
16. Fred Barbash, At White House, a Flurryover Who's in Charge, WASH. POST, Mar.
31, 1981, at A14. Recently, I watched an old movie entitled The Day Reagan Was Shot.
THE DAY REAGAN WAS SHOT (Paramount Pictures 2001). It depicts the "incredible true
story of a nation in chaos." However accurate or inaccurate the film may be, it certainly
helps us imagine what might happen in the future. The film's lesson is simple: under our
current laws and procedures, we are frighteningly close to becoming a "nation in chaos."
Thanks to Bob Schiff, Democratic Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on the
Constitution, for bringing this film to my attention.
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succession to the Presidency, as well as the President himself.
Who is the President? 7
To be sure, fear of uncertainty about our ability to identify our
Commander in Chief in moments of national crisis is not new. After all,
the current version of the Presidential Succession Act has been on the
books for some time. But such uncertainty, although always intolerable,
is especially so in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. As Senator Cornyn
has put it:
In every one of these scenarios, we do not know for sure who
the President is-a chilling thought for all Americans. In an age
of terrorism and a time of war, this is no longer mere fodder for
Tom Clancy novels and episodes of "The West Wing." These
nightmare scenarios are serious concerns after 9/11. On that
terrible day, federal officers ordered a dramatic evacuation of
the White House, even shouting at White House staffers:
"Run!" On that day, the Secret Service executed its emergency
plan to protect and defend the line of Presidential successionfor the first time ever in American history, according to some
reports. And in subsequent months, the President and Vice
President were constantly kept separate,... precisely out of the
fear that continuity of the Presidency might otherwise be in
serious jeopardy."'
As these scenarios disturbingly illustrate, current law is plainly
inadequate to ensure either a functioning Congress or a clear line of
Presidential succession. Yet it is far from clear that there is sufficient
political will in Congress to act. These issues can and should be
nonpartisan. However, there is not, at least to date, a sufficient working
majority to support the kinds of reforms necessary to truly ensure
continuity of government in the wake of a catastrophic terrorist attack.

17. Presidency Hearing, supra note 10 (statement of Sen.
http://judiciary.senate.gov/memberstatement.cfm?id=914&wit-id=2047

John Cornyn),
(alteration
in

original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6).
18. Id.; see also 60 Minutes II: President Bush Tells His 9/11 Story (CBS News
television broadcast, Sept. 11, 2002), 2002 WL 7034533 ("[F]or the first time ever, the
Secret Service executed the emergency plan to ensure the presidential line of succession.
Agents swept up the 15 officials who stood to become president if the others were
killed."); Calvin Woodward, Washington Reels in Terror Attacks, AP ONLINE, Sept. 15,

2001, 2001 WL 27337197. The AP reported:
The Secret Service at first hustled West Wing staffers into the basement, then
told them to leave the building-but to walk, not run. That changed in a matter
of seconds. In a level voice, one plainclothes agent accompanying the stream of
aides told them: "We don't want you to walk anymore. Run. And if you have
heels on and can't run, take off your shoes. Run!"
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This article analyzes the ongoing debate in Congress over proposed
reforms to ensure continuity of government.
Part I examines the
extensive debate that has taken place thus far with respect to
congressional operations. It explores the need for a constitutional
amendment to solve continuity problems in the Congress. Part I then
addresses objections that have been raised to the constitutional solutions
recommended by members of both parties. Unlike the congressional
debate over continuity of Congress, the debate over Presidential
succession is still to come. Accordingly, Part II only briefly addresses the
political constraints currently facing reform in that area.

I. PROPOSALS TO ENSURE CONTINUITY OF THE CONGRESS
On November 5, 2003, Senator Cornyn introduced a constitutional
amendment and implementing legislation to ensure continuity of
congressional operations.' 9 The amendment, Senate Joint Resolution 23,
authorizes Congress to enact laws providing for congressional
succession, 0 just as Article I of the Constitution authorizes laws
providing for Presidential succession.2
The implementing legislation,
Senate bill 1820, authorizes each state to craft its own mechanisms for
filling vacancies and addressing incapacities in its congressional
delegations-just as the Seventeenth Amendment authorizes states to
decide how to fill vacancies in the Senate. 22 Under this bill's approach,
each state could choose appointments based on a predetermined list of
successors, special elections, or some other mechanism for ensuring

19. S.J. Res. 23,108th Cong. (2003); S. 1820,108th Cong. (2003).
20. S.J. Res. 23. The proposed amendment states:
The Congress may by law provide for the case of death or inability of Members
of the House of Representatives, and the case of inability of Members of the
Senate, in the event that one-fourth of either House are killed or incapacitated,
declaring who shall serve until the disability is removed, or a new Member is
elected. Any procedures established pursuant to such a law shall expire not later
than 120 days after the death or inability of one-fourth of the House of
Representatives or the Senate, but may be extended for additional 120-day
periods if one-fourth of either the House of Representatives or the Senate
remains vacant or occupied by members unable to serve.
Id. The Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution approved the resolution in a bipartisan
vote on May 13, 2004, after accepting an amendment by Senator Russ Feingold. That
amendment provides that any implementing legislation must be approved by a two-thirds
vote of both houses of Congress. See S. Judiciary Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil
Rights & Property Rights: Meeting on the Continuity of Government, 108th Cong. (2004)
[hereinafter Subcomm. Meeting] (statement of Sen. Russ Feingold), http://judiciary.senate.
gov/member statement.cfm?id=1185&witid=85.
21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
22. Id. amend. XVII; S. 1820.
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continuity of Congress.23 On January 27, 2004, the Senate Judiciary
Committee held a hearing on Senator Cornyn's proposed constitutional
amendment2 4 That same day, Senators Cornyn, Lott, and Christopher
Dodd introduced new bipartisan implementing legislation, Senate bill
2031, entitled the Continuity of the Senate Act of 2004, which
incorporates only those provisions of Senate bill 1820 that affect the
Senate. 2' And in May, with the support of the ranking Democratic
Senator Russ Feingold, the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution
approved Senate Joint Resolution 23, as amended, in a bipartisan vote .
There also has been much activity on the House side, although of a
different kind. Representatives Brian Baird, Zoe Lofgren, John Larson,
and Dana Rohrabacher have all proposed constitutional amendments to
27
ensure continuity of Congress. But most attention has been focused on
House bill 2844, introduced by Congressman James Sensenbrenner,
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. That bill would require
states to conduct expedited special elections in the event that a large
number of members of the House is killed. At first, the bill would have
required special elections to be held within twenty-one days of the
catastrophic event. 28 The bill has since been amended to require
expedited special elections within forty-five days. 29 The Committee on
House Administration held hearings on the original bill on September
24, 2003,30 and then reported the bill as amended on a party line vote on
December 8, 2003. 3' The House Judiciary Committee subsequently
reported the bill for the consideration of the entire House, again on a

23. See Cornyn, The Unthinkable,supra note 2.
24. Ensuring the Continuity of the United States Government: A Proposed
Constitutional Amendment to Guarantee a Functioning Congress: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Constitutional Amendment
Hearing],http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1022.
25. S. 2031, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 1820.
26. See Subcomm. Meeting, supra note 20. In addition, Senator Christopher Dodd
(D-CT) has also offered encouraging words. See 150 CONG. REC. S8645-86 (daily ed. July

22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
27. H.R.J. Res. 96, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R.J. Res. 92, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R.J.
Res. 90, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R.J. Res. 89, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R.J. Res. 83, 108th

Cong. (2004); H.R.J. Res. 77, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R.J. Res. 77, 107th Cong. (2003);
H.R.J. Res. 67,107th Cong. (2003).
28. H.R. 2844, 108th Cong. (2003).

29. Id.
30. Hearing on the Continuity of Congress: Special Elections in Extraordinary
Circumstances Before the Comm. on House Admin., 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter
Special Elections Hearing],http://www.house.gov/cha/cb.html.
31. H.R. REP. No. 108-404, pt. 1, at 5 (2003).
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party line vote.32 The House approved the bill, which now awaits
consideration by the Senate.
Some supporters of a constitutional amendment warn, however, that
special elections take months to conduct properly-time we may not
have and too much time to go without a functioning Congress amid crisis.
They also believe that special elections require more time than
contemplated by either the original proposal introduced by Congressman
Sensenbrenner or the amended bill. In other words, the period of time
for special elections is both too short and too long, according to
detractors of the Sensenbrenner proposal.
Twenty-one days (and even forty-five days) is too short, according to
state and local elections officials. After all, it is one thing to plan for an
election that has been scheduled months or even years in advance, but it
is quite another to conduct an election from a standing start. It takes
time to qualify the candidates, hire poll workers, prepare voter rolls and
voting machines, reserve polling locations, conduct the actual election,
and then determine and verify the election results.34 There is also the
fear that expedited elections would effectively disenfranchise military
and other absentee voters. 35 Finally, giving voters and candidates just a
few days or weeks to debate issues and examine qualifications presents
serious concerns of democratic integrity.
Forty-five days may also be too long to wait for Congress to
reconvene. Congress is not in session year-round, but it may need to
convene immediately in a time of crisis. Recall the days and weeks
immediately following 9/11. Two days after the attacks, Congress
approved legislation expediting benefits for public safety officers killed
or injured in the line of duty. 36

Three days after 9/11, Congress

32. Id. pt. 2, at 10-11.
33. See 150 CONG. REc. H2301-35 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004).
34. Consider, for example, the September 9 testimony of R. Doug Lewis, Executive
Director of the Election Center (www.electioncenter.org). Congressional Continuity
Hearing,supra note 1 (testimony of R. Doug Lewis, Executive Director of the Election
Center), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=909&wit-id=2566.
35. See id. (testimony of Samuel F. Wright, Director of the Military Voting Rights
Project
at
the
National
Defense
Committee),
http://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfmid=909&wit_id=2570, for the problems that House Resolution 2844 would
present to the voting rights of military personnel serving abroad. The Defense
Department recently called off, at least for now, an initiative to experiment with Internet
voting by military personnel serving abroad, a project that might someday expedite voting
processes for our servicemen. See Dan Keating, Pentagon Calls Off Voting by Internet,
WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2004, at A12.
36. See Expedited Payment for Heroic Public Safety Officers, Pub. L. No. 107-37, 115
Stat. 219 (2001). Both houses of Congress approved this legislation on September 13. Id.
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appropriated $40 billion in emergency funds for recovery and response,37
and passed legislation authorizing the use of military force.3" A week
later, Congress approved additional legislation to stabilize and secure our
economy and airports, and provide compensation for the victims. 9 And
in subsequent weeks, Congress enacted other bills and appropriations
measures to bolster national security and upgrade our capabilities to
combat terrorism. 40 Had the events of 9/11 unfolded differently,
however, Congress could have been disabled, and this legislation might
not have been enacted in a timely fashion. Indeed, it is widely believed
that the terrorists who hijacked United Airlines Flight 93 would have
struck the Capitol on September 11, but for a late departure and the
41
ensuing heroism of its passengers.
This is not to say that special elections are an inappropriate mechanism
for ensuring continuity of Congress-it is just to say that special elections
alone may not be enough to ensure a functioning Congress in the
immediate wake of a catastrophic terrorist attack. In the event of mass
vacancies, a constitutional amendment like Senate Joint Resolution 23
would enable the use of alternative mechanisms for reconstituting
Congress immediately, thereby ensuring a nationally representative
Congress during the time it takes to execute special elections. Moreover,
a constitutional amendment is the only way to ensure continuity of
Congress in the face of mass incapacitation. After all, the Constitution
provides no mechanisms whatsoever for redressing mass incapacitations
in the Congress.
The traditional method for amending the Constitution requires
ratification by two-thirds of Congress and three-fourths of the states. 42 It
is obviously more difficult to enact a constitutional amendment than a
statute. Therefore, it is particularly important for those who favor a

37. See 2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and
Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-38, 115 Stat. 220
(2001). Both houses of Congress approved this legislation on September 14. Id. at 221.
38. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001). Both houses of Congress approved this legislation on September 14. Id. at 225.
39. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
115 Stat. 230 (2001). Both houses of Congress approved this legislation on September 21.
Id. at 242.
40. See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
41. CONTINUITY OF GOv'T COMM'N, supra note 2, app. II; see also NAT'L COMM'N
ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 14 (2004).

42. U.S. CONST. art. V. The Founders also provided for the use of constitutional
conventions to propose amendments, id., but that mechanism has never been utilized to
date.
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constitutional amendment to understand the four major arguments
employed against such efforts.
A. The Vision of the Founders

First, and perhaps most fundamental, is the argument that a
constitutional amendment to ensure continuity of Congress offends the
vision of the Founding Fathers.43 Under the Constitution, members of
the House have always been elected directly by the people. This is not
true of the Senate. Before the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment,
Moreover, under the
senators were never popularly elected.
Seventeenth Amendment, state legislatures may empower governors to
make immediate appointments to fill vacancies in the Senate, and every
state except Oklahoma," Oregon,45 Wisconsin,46 and Massachusetts 47 has
done so. This difference between the House and the Senate has been
upheld by some as sacrosanct. They argue that we must never amend the

43. See, e.g., News Advisory, Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Statement
upon Introduction of "Continuity of Representation Act," http://www.house.
gov/judiciary/news072403.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004). Congressman Sensenbrenner
has been the most active congressional proponent of this view. In his release, he stated:
Some are arguing for the adoption of a constitutional amendment that would
allow for the appointment of replacement Members of the House of
Representatives if large numbers of vacancies exist following a terrorist attack.
Such an amendment would destroy the uninterrupted tradition that only
Members duly elected by their local constituents should serve in the House.
Even worse, such an amendment would take away the people's right to chosen
representation while ignoring the current mechanism for preserving continuity in
government the Founders, in their wisdom, included in the Constitution, and
which is the basis for the legislation I am introducing today.

Id.
44. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 12-101 (West Supp. 2004). Oklahoma law does
provide for gubernatorial appointment to fill a U.S. Senate vacancy in certain limited
situations. Specifically, if the vacancy is created near the end of the six-year Senate term,
Oklahoma law requires the governor to immediately appoint the individual selected to
serve in the U.S. Senate by the voters of that state at the next regularly scheduled general
election. See id. § 12-101(b). Section (b) states:
No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs after March 1 of any
even-numbered year if the term of the office expires the following year. In such
case, the candidate elected to the office at the regular General Election shall
be appointed by the Governor to fill the unexpired term.
Id.
45. See OR. REV. STAT. § 188.120 (2001).
46. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 17.18 (West 2003).
47. The Massachusetts Legislature recently stripped its Governor of the power to fill
Senate vacancies by appointment. See Scott S. Greenberger, Romney Veto Overridden,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 31, 2004, at B1, LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File.
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Constitution to depart from the tradition of exclusively elected
membership in the House.
This is a fundamental, philosophical dispute. Some members uphold
the original structure of our Constitution as absolute and unyielding, and
are unwilling to depart from that structure no matter what the
consequences. 49 Under this view, it would not matter that the House
could not convene itself for months while states conducted special
elections, nor would it matter that the House could not reconstitute itself
for as long as two years (the time it might take to elect and inaugurate a
new Congress) if a majority of representatives were incapacitated. (As
noted earlier, the problem of incapacity is even worse in the Senate-if a
majority of senators were incapacitated, the Senate would be disabled for
as long as four years-because only one-third of the Senate can be
replenished at every biennial election.)
I submit, however, that the competing view in favor of a constitutional
amendment is no less faithful to the Founders-it simply understands the
Founders' vision differently. Senator Cornyn opened the January 27
hearing by noting that:
Our Constitution does not prepare us for such dire
circumstances, because our Founders could not have
contemplated the horrors of 9/11. After all, they lived in a
world free of weapons of mass destruction. They established a
Presidency to command an army and navy, but no air force.
They structured our system of government specifically to
disfavor standing armies. Yet the Founders, in their great
wisdom, well understood that they could not predict everything
that this new nation might someday need, or what the future
might someday hold. They wisely ratified the constitution
specifically because it included a built-in procedure for
amendment, in Article V of the Constitution.

48.

See supra note 43.

See generally COALITION TO PRESERVE AN ELECTED

CONGRESS, at http://www.electcongress.org (last visited June 12, 2004).
49. See supra note 43.
50. Constitutional Amendment Hearing, supra note 24 (opening statement of Sen.
Cornyn), http://judiciary.senate.gov/member_statement.cfm?id=1022&wit id=2047. See
generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
1 (designating the President as "Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United States"); id. art. 1,§ 8 cls. 12-14 (empowering
Congress to "raise and support Armies," to "provide and maintain a Navy," and to "make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"); id. cl. 12
(empowering Congress to "raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to
that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years"); THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 13 (U.S. 1776) (complaining that King George III "has kept among
us, in times of peace, standing armies, without the consent of our legislatures"); JOHN
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Indeed, the Constitution has been previously amended to make
fundamental institutional changes to the structure of government
comparable to those being urged today. If we adhered strictly to the
original constitutional framework, today the Senate would still be an
appointive body rather than an elective body."' Likewise, we would not
have the Twenty-fifth Amendment, which provides the ability to appoint
rather than elect our Vice President.
B. The Relationship Between the House and the Senate
Second, some argue that the Senate has no business meddling with any
of the internal affairs of the House, including the reconstitution of its
membership, even in a time of crisis.53 After all, there is an established
tradition that each house defers to the other on matters such as its

PHILLIP REID, IN DEFIANCE OF THE LAW: THE STANDING-ARMY CONTROVERSY, THE
Two CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1981).

As Professor Sanford Levinson testified at that same hearing:
I mentioned earlier that I had edited a book titled Responding to Imperfection.
That title comes from a letter written by George Washington to his nephew
Bushrod Washington (who would later become a distinguished member of the
Supreme Court of the United States). Bushrod's uncle was the man probably
most responsible for there being a new Constitution at all; he became president
of the Constitutional Convention because it was his unimpeachable stature that
convinced doubters in the first place to support the Philadelphia Convention
itself [and then to ratify its remarkable handiwork] ..
T..
ITjhe warmest friends
and the best supporters the Constitution has, [wrote George Washington], do not
contend that it is free from imperfections." Fortunately, when inevitable
imperfections do manifest themselves, "there is a Constitutional door open. The
People (for it is with them to Judge) can, as they will have the advantage of
experience on their Side, decide with as much propriety on the alterations and
amendment which are necessary." Should the point not already be clear enough,
Washington went on to say that "I do not think we are more inspired, have more
wisdom, or possess more virtue, than those who will come after us." I have
emphasized the words "the advantage of experience," because it dishonors the
memory of those we call the Founders, of whom Washington is surely one of the
greatest, to believe that they in fact believed that they had struck off an
absolutely perfect document which need never be scrutinized or changed.
Indeed, the very existence of Article V is the best testament to that belief.
Constitutional Amendment Hearing, supra note 24 (testimony of Sanford Levinson),
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1022&wit-id=2919 (emphasis added) (citing
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION (Sanford Levinson ed. 1995)): see also John Cornyn,
Amending the Constitution: A Process that Lets the People Speak, AUSTIN AM.STATESMAN, June 12, 2004, at AI5.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.

52. Id. amend. XXV, § 2; see also id. amend. XX.
53. See, e.g., Suzanne Nelson, Bill Addresses Incapacitated Senators, ROLL CALL,
Feb. 3, 2004, LEXIS, News Library, Rollcl File ("Sensenbrenner has indicated that he
doesn't appreciate Senate involvement in how the House selects its Members, even in a
crisis.").
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respective internal rules and crafting the budget for the operation of each
Chamber. 4
However, an important functional difference exists between internal
rules and internal budgets, on the one hand, and mechanisms to ensure
continuity of House operations on the other hand. The rules and budget
for each Chamber do not have any direct impact on the operations and
constitutional responsibilities of the other.
If one house is
constitutionally disabled from functioning at all, however, that severely
impacts the functioning of the other house. 55 Moreover, there is no firm
tradition of deferring to the other house on such matters as the
composition of Congress. The House of Representatives initiated the
constitutional amendment process that culminated in the Seventeenth
Amendment,56 while the Senate has approved three different
constitutional amendments (in 1954, 57 1955,'8 and 196059) to address
continuity problems in the House of Representatives.
Nevertheless, Senator Cornyn has taken two steps in hopes of
achieving comity and reaching agreement with his colleagues in the
House. First, his original November proposal did not take sides in the
heated House debate over the use of emergency interim appointments
versus reliance on special elections alone; his proposal would simply
delegate to each state the power to make its own decision, consistent

54.

See id.

55. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 (requiring the consent of a majority of both
houses before the legislative power of Congress can be exercised); see also Cornyn, A
Republic, supra note 2.
56. Throughout the 1890s, substantial majorities of the House approved what is now

the Seventeenth Amendment. Yet the Senate refused to permit the amendment even to
reach a vote until 1911. See, e.g., GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED
STATES 93, 96-97, 100-15 (1938); JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND
EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 64 (rev. ed. 1992); Kris W. Kobach, Rethinking Article V: Term
Limits and the 17th and 18th Amendments, 103 YALE L.J. 1971, 1976-80 (1994). The

legislative history of the Seventeenth Amendment thus provides an interesting parallel to
the ongoing debate over a constitutional amendment to ensure continuity of Congress.
57. S.J. Res. 39, 86th Cong. (1954), reprinted in CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N,

supra note 2, app. VI, at 44-45. The Senate approved this resolution by a vote of seventy
to one on June 4, 1954. CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 2, app. VI, at 44.
58. S.J. Res. 8, 84th Cong. (1954), reprinted in CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N,

supra note 2, app. VI, at 45. The Senate approved this resolution by a vote of seventy-six
to three on May 19, 1955. CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 2, app. VI, at 45.
59. S.J. Res. 39, 86th Cong. (1959), reprinted in CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N,

supra note 2, app. VI, at 45-46. The Senate approved this resolution by a vote of seventy
to eighteen on February 2, 1960. CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 2, app. VI.
at 45.
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with the Seventeenth Amendment.0' As Senator Cornyn explained in his
opening remarks before the Senate Judiciary Committee on January 27:
I recognize that some House members favor emergency interim
appointments to ensure immediate continuity of House
operations, while others prefer to rely solely on expedited
special elections. My November proposal takes no sides in this
debate. Some states, in order to expedite the conduct of special
elections, may be prepared to adopt Internet voting, enact
same-day registration laws, or abandon party primaries-while
other states may be concerned that expedited special elections
are undemocratic or will disenfranchise military voters. Under
my approach, each state would make its own choice.6'

Senator Cornyn's second step toward reaching agreement with the
House was the new implementing legislation, Senate bill 2031,
introduced by Senator Cornyn on January 27, 2004, and cosponsored by
Senators Dodd and Lott.6' That legislation was called the Continuity of
the Senate Act of 2004, because it focused exclusively on the continuity
problems uniquely facing the Senate. 6' As Senator Cornyn stated: "If
House members decide to rely solely on special elections to cure
continuity problems in their chamber, I will not stand in their way. By
the same token, the House should not prevent senators from resolving
continuity issues in our chamber." 64
C. The Length of Time Necessary to Amend the Constitution

The third argument against a constitutional amendment reasons that if
we are truly concerned about ensuring continuity of government in the
wake of a terrorist attack, we should focus on a solution that can be
enacted immediately. That is, we should enact statutes, rather than
constitutional amendments, because constitutional amendments require
far too much time to ratify. 65 This argument likewise is answerable.

60. Constitutional Amendment Hearing, supra note 24 (opening statement of Sen.
Cornyn), http://judiciary.senate.gov/memberstatement.cfm?id=1022&wit-id=2047.
61.

Id.; see also Cornyn, The Unthinkable,supra note 2.

62.

S. 2031, 108th Cong. (2004).

63.

Constitutional Amendment Hearing, supra note 24 (opening statement of Sen.

Cornyn), http://judiciary.senate.gov/member-statement.cfm?id=1022&wit-id=2047.
64. Id.; see also Cornyn, Let Each Decide, supra note 2.
65. See, e.g., Suzanne Nelson, Simpson Rips Judiciary Chairman on Continuity, ROLL
CALL, Jan. 28, 2004, LEXIS, News Library, Rollcl File ("'I guess there's just an

embarrassing lack of logic by the commission,' [House Judiciary Communications
Director Jeff] Lungren added, because if fixing continuity is such a 'high priority,' a
constitutional amendment isn't the way to go because it will take years.").
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Amendments to the Constitution need not take years to ratify.
Certainly, nothing in Article V of the Constitution imposes a minimum
temporal requirement. 66 Moreover, as a matter of practice, many
constitutional amendments have been ratified swiftly following their
proposal by Congress. Nine of our amendments,6 7for example, took less
than a year for three-fourths of the states to ratify.
D. Statutory Alternativesfor Addressing Mass Incapacities
The last argument disputes the need for a constitutional amendment,
even to address the problem of mass incapacities in Congress. The
Constitution specifically empowers Congress to deal with an
incapacitated President,6 but provides no such power with respect to
incapacities in the Congress. Nevertheless, statutory alternatives have
been suggested to ensure a functioning Congress in the wake of mass
incapacities.
1. Evading the ConstitutionalQuorum Requirement
The statutory alternative receiving the most serious consideration is a
proposal to amend the quorum rules. Under this proposal, if a majority
of members was incapacitated, a minority of senators or representatives
could still constitute a quorum and exercise the constitutional functions
of Congress, notwithstanding the Article I requirement that "a majority
of each [house] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business., 69 Supporters
of this proposal point out that House rules require only a majority of
those members who are living.7° In other words, if a large number of
representatives were killed, the numerical requirement for a quorum
would be reduced accordingly.
Therefore, some suggest further
amending the House quorum rules to allow action provided a majority of
non-incapacitated members is present.

66. U.S. CONST. art. V.
Contrast, for example, the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, whose amendment procedure requires approval by two
consecutive sessions of the State legislature, thereby effectively imposing a minimum
temporal requirement. See MASS. CONST. amend. XLVIII.
67. They are the Eleventh (340 days), Twelfth (231 days), Thirteenth (309 days),
Fifteenth (342 days), Seventeenth (330 days), Twentieth (327 days), Twenty-first (288
days), Twenty-third (285 days), and Twenty-sixth Amendments (100 days). See JOHN R.
VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS,

AND AMENDING ISSUES 1789-1995 app. B (1996).

68.
69.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § t,cl.
6.
Id. art. 1,§ 5, cl. 1.

70. Under House rules, a majority of the living membership is sufficient, even if that
number does not constitute a majority of the whole number of authorized seats. RULES
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 108TH CONG. R. XX(5)(c), at 31 (2003), available

at http://www.house.gov/rules/108rules.pdf.
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This argument presents a number of problems. First, the proposed
7
The
change to the quorum rules is almost certainly unconstitutional.
Supreme Court unanimously held in United States v. Ballin that internal
house rules are invalid if they violate the Constitution.72 There is
substantial evidence that the Founders intended to forbid either house of
Congress from taking action without the participation of at least a
majority of the entire body, even though they knew full well that
Congress could be effectively shut down in the absence of a majority of
either house.73
At the Constitutional Convention, proponents and opponents of the
quorum rule alike understood that by ensuring a minority of members
could not exercise the powers of Congress, the majority quorum
Congress by
requirement effectively empowered states to
S 74shut down
Alexander Hamilton
refusing to select and send representatives.
specifically acknowledged this possibility in Federalist No. 59.71 Indeed,
at the beginning of the very first Congress, both houses struggled and
were unable to begin operations for failure to reach quorum.76 Each

71. See Cornyn, New Amendment, supra note 2; see also Norman Ornstein, Recipe for
Sham Elections, WASH. POST, May 7, 2004, at A33; Norman Ornstein, Defining Quorums
Down: A Bad Idea That's Ripe for Abuse, ROLL CALL, July 21, 2004, LEXIS, News
Library, Rollcl File.
72. 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892).
73. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 251-52 (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
74. See id. ("Col. Mason. [The quorum requirement] is a valuable & necessary part
of the plan. In this extended Country, embracing so great a diversity of interests, it would
be dangerous to the distant parts to allow a small number of members of the two Houses
to make laws."); id. at 253 ("Mr. Elseworth [stated that i]t would be a pleasing ground of
confidence to the people that no law or burden could be imposed on them, by a few
men."); id. at 251 ("Mr. Mercer was also for less than a majority. So great a number will
put it in the power of a few by seceding at a critical moment to introduce convulsions, and
endanger the Government.").
75. THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 307-08 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gideon ed., 2001)
("It may be alleged, that by declining the appointment of senators, they might at any time
give a fatal blow to the union . . . . It is certainly true that the state legislatures, by
forbearing the appointment of senators, may destroy the national government.").
If the State legislatures were to be invested with an exclusive power of regulating
these elections, every period of making them would be a delicate crisis in the
national situation; which might issue in a dissolution of the union, if the leaders
of a few of the most important states should have entered into a previous
conspiracy to prevent an election.
Id. at 309.
76. 1 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Gales & Seaton 1826) (1789)
[hereinafter HOUSE JOURNAL], http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwhjlink.html.
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house steadfastly refused
to act until meeting the required "majority of
77
the whole number.,
Hence, according to the Founders, states could conspire to shut down
Congress simply through refusing to send representatives, by virtue of
the Constitution's quorum rules. 78 On the same principle, terrorists can
shut down Congress simply by killing or incapacitating enough
representatives, also by virtue of the Constitution's quorum rules. In
addition, during the Eighty-fourth Congress, the Senate considered and
approved a constitutional amendment specifically providing that a
majority of members of each house who are "chosen, sworn, and living"
shall be sufficient to constitute a quorum to do business. 79 This suggests
that the Constitution did not otherwise allow such a lowering of the
quorum requirement absent an amendment. Arguably, then, anything
less than "a majority of the whole number" cannot exercise the
constitutional power of the Congress. 0

77. See id. In the House, only thirteen members attended the first day, March 4,
1789. Id. At that time, the entirety of the House was comprised of fifty-nine members
representing eleven states. Rhode Island and North Carolina had not yet ratified the
Constitution, so their collective six members were not counted as part of the House at that
time. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.
3. The House thus adjourned, "a quorum of the whole
number not being present." HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 76. Over the next several
weeks, on a daily basis, the House convened and adjourned for lack of quorum, until April
1, when the thirtieth member finally appeared. Id. It was only then that the House began
to take action, "a quorum, consisting of a majority of the whole number, being present."
Id. Similarly, in the Senate, only eight members attended the first day, March 4, 1789.
JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE, (Gales & Seaton 1820) (1789),
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsjlink.html#anchorl. At that time, the entirety of
the Senate was comprised of twenty-two senators representing eleven states. Id. The
Senate thus adjourned, "[t]he number not being sufficient to constitute a quorum." Id.
Over the next several weeks, on a regular basis, the Senate convened and adjourned for
lack of quorum, until April 6, when the twelfth senator finally appeared. Id. It was only
then that the Senate began to take action, having established "a Quorum, consisting of a
majority of the whole number of Senators of the United States." Id.
78. See discussion supra notes 74-75.
79. See S.J. Res. 8, 84th Cong. (1954), reprinted in CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N,
supra note 2, app. VI, at 45.
80. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1892). The Court has twice unanimously
expressed this view, by holding that "a majority of those present may act, provided those
present constitute a majority of the whole number .... [A] major part of the whole is
necessary to constitute a quorum, and a majority of the quorum may act." Id. (quoting
Brown v. District of Columbia, 127 U.S. 579, 586 (1888)); see also 2 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 832 (1833). This
section states:
The propriety of establishing a rule for a quorum for the despatch of business is
equally clear; since otherwise the concerns of the nation might be decided by a
very small number of the members of each body ....[B]y requiring a majority
for a quorum, [the United States] has secured the public from any hazard of
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To be sure, the current rules and precedents of each house provide for
a quorum based not on a majority of the whole house, but instead based
on a majority of those members sworn, chosen, and living, who have
neither resigned their office, nor been removed from it by expulsion."'
The current quorum rules thus do not require a majority of the total
number of authorized seats,"2 but instead require only a majority of the
current membership. In other words, each house may exclude all vacant
seats from the calculation. They may ignore seats that are not filled by a
sworn, chosen, and living member, and they also may ignore seats
vacated due to resignation or expulsion.
There is a big difference, however, between the current rules and
precedents for defining quorum, on the one hand, and the proposal to
change the rules to exclude incapacitated members from the total
number needed to determine a quorum, on the other hand. As the
House Parliamentarian recently testified before the House Rules
Committee, the House enjoys a certain amount of discretion and
flexibility to determine what "a Majority of [the 'House]" means."
Congress can decide that a quorum requires a majority of the
membership, and exclude seats that are vacant, as expressly provided
under the current rules of the House. In short, one can plausibly argue
that "a Majority of each [house]" means either a majority of the whole
number of seats, or a majority of the membership, thus excluding vacant
seats. 8 4 Under this theory, Congress can pick the definition it prefers.

passing laws by surprise, or against the deliberate opinion of a majority of the
representative body.
Id.
81. See supra note 70.
82. The composition of the Senate is fixed by the Constitution itself. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 3, cl. I ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from
each State ....
"). The composition of the House is constrained by the Constitution,
although the actual whole number is ultimately determined by an act of Congress. See id.
amend. XIV, § 2 ("Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers .... "); id. art 1, § 2, cl. 3 ("The actual Enumeration
shall be made.., within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall
by Law direct."); id. ("The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every
thirty thousand .... "); id. ("[E]ach State shall have at Least one Representative ....
);
Act of Aug. 8, 1911, ch. 5 §§ 1-2, 37 Stat. 13, 14 (fixing the composition of the House of
Representatives at 435 members).
83. See Continuity of Congress: An Examination of the Existing Quorum Requirement
and the Mass Incapacitationof Members: HearingBefore the Comm. on Rules, 108th Cong.
(2004) [hereinafter Examination Hearing] (statement of Charles W. Johnson,
Parliamentarian of the House), http://www.house.gov/rules/johnson-testmass-incap.pdf;
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
See generally Examination Hearing, supra,

http://www.house.gov/rules/mass-incap.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2004).
84. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 1.
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What is not plausible, however, is the claim that Congress can exclude
members altogether in determining the presence of a quorum. The
Constitution is explicit when it provides that only "a Majority of each
[house] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business."8" Additionally, other
provisions of the Constitution explicitly vest specific powers either in a
smaller group of members, as with the power to adjourn and the power
to compel the attendance of absent members, 6 or in members who
happen to be "present" in the chamber, as with the power to convict in
impeachment trials,87 the power to call for the yeas and nays,m and the
power to consent to treaties. All other powers of the House or Senate,
however, can be exercised only by "a majority of each [house]." " Any
attempt to enact legislation, approve appropriations, or consent to
nominations or treaties on the basis of a quorum smaller than a majority
of the membership of the House thus contradicts these constitutional
provisions.
Any attempt to reduce the quorum requirement would also offend the
Constitution by effectively depriving elected officials of their seat in
Congress. Members of the Congress are elected and constitutionally
entitled to serve either two-year or six-year terms-terms that can be
shortened only by death, resignation, or a two-thirds vote to expel a
member.9' To dilute the quorum requirement is to effectively treat
incapacitated members as non-members, in violation of the Constitution.
In addition to these constitutional problems, the enactment of
legislation by a smaller body is hardly desirable as a prudential matter. It
was certainly undesirable to the drafters of the Constitution. The
Founders were clearly committed to a nationally representative
Congress, and they specifically objected to the enactment
of national
2
legislation by a geographic minority as antidemocratic.9
Finally, a change to the quorum rule would not guarantee a
functioning Congress in every event. If every single member in either
chamber were incapacitated, there would be no members available to
make use of such a rule.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id. § 3, cl. 6.
Id. § 5, cl. 3.
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Id. art. 1,§ 5,cl. 1.
Id. §§ 2, cl. 1,3, cl. 1,5, cl. 2; see infra note 100.
See supra notes 74-75.
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2. Power of Attorney

Some have proposed using power of attorney arrangements to deal
with incapacities.93 Under this approach, members of Congress sign
agreements to empower someone else to assume their office in case they
become unable to discharge their duties. 4 But even if members were
willing to sign such agreements, it remains unclear whether these
arrangements would be either constitutional or fair.9
On the
constitutional front, if a President cannot sign a power of attorney
transferring his power to sign legislation, and -a member
of Congress
97
cannot delegate his power to vote for legislation, as has long been
believed, how can a member of Congress constitutionally delegate his
power to resign from office? And as to fairness, if a biological or
chemical attack incapacitated a senator for his entire first year in office,
but no more, it would be unfair to deprive the senator of his office when
he may be able to serve for the remainder of his term.
3. No Statutory Authority to Replace IncapacitatedMembers

The Constitution clearly establishes two-year terms for members of the
House and six-year terms for members of the Senate.99 There are only
three ways in which those terms of office can be cut short: the
Constitution expressly empowers two-thirds of each house to expel a
member,9 and any member can, of course, die or resign while in office.
Absent death, resignation, or expulsion, however, every member
possesses what amounts to a de facto constitutional right to his office.l" '
93. Sensenbrenner, supra note 43.
94. See id.
95. See Relation of the President to the Executive Departments, 7 Op. Att'y Gen.
453, 465 (1855) [hereinafter Attorney General Opinion].
96. See Presidential Succession and Delegation in Case of Disability, 5 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 91, 94 (1981) ("[N]ondelegable functions of the President" include "[t]he power
to approve or return legislation pursuant to Article I, § 7, clauses 2 and 3."): see also
Attorney General Opinion, supra note 95, at 465 (1855) ("[The President] approves or
disapproves of bills which have passed both Houses of Congress: that is a personal act of
the President, like the vote of a Senator or Representatives in Congress, not capable of
performance by a Head of Department or any other person.").
97. See Attorney General Opinion, supra note 95, at 465 ("[T]he vote of a Senator or
Representatives in Congress

. . .

[is] not capable of performance by .

.

. any other

person.").
98. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3.
99. Id. § 5, c1i2.
100. Professor Howard Wasserman's testimony demonstrates this point:
The broad understanding we can derive from the Supreme Court's decisions in
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) and Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), is that once a chosen Member has met the
enumerated constitutional qualifications for that house, she must be seated. No
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Absent death, resignation, or expulsion, the power to enact legislation to
provide continuity of Congress under both Article I and the Seventeenth
Amendment is unavailable because these provisions apply only in the
case of vacancies."" Congressional or state legislation depriving a duly
elected member of his or her seat would almost certainly violate the text
and structure of the Constitution, as articulated in Supreme Court1 2 cases
like Powell v. McCormack and U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton. 0
II. PROPOSALS TO ENSURE CONTINUITY OF THE PRESIDENCY
I would just point out two aspects of potential congressional action on
the Presidential succession front.
Senator Cornyn, Senator Mike
DeWine, Representative Christopher Cox, Representative Brad
Sherman, and others have proposed changes to the Presidential
Succession Act or other reforms to our system of Presidential
succession. 3 All of these bills have at least one thing in common: they
are statutory, not constitutional proposals. Although some may argue
that a constitutional amendment is, in fact, needed to solve Presidential
succession problems,"' just as one is needed to ensure adequate
continuity of congressional operations," there is even less political will
for an amendment regarding the Presidency.""' Though some have noted
weaknesses and defects in the Twenty-fifth Amendment, the

new qualifications or requirements can be imposed on her ability to assume the
seat. Once an individual is seated at the beginning of one Congress, she holds
that seat for six years in the Senate, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, or two years
in the House, see id. § 2, cl. 1, unless and until she dies, resigns, is expelled from
Congress by 2/3 supermajority vote, see id. § 5, cl. 2, or the term of office ends.
There is no mechanism for Congress or states to remove or replace a chosen,
sworn, and living member of either house of Congress. Put somewhat differently,
with the limited exception of expulsion, neither Congress nor states presently has
any constitutional power to fill an occupied seat prior to the end of the applicable
two- or six-year period. This amendment is necessary to grant that power.
Constitutional Amendment Hearing, supra note 24 (testimony of Howard Wasserman),
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1022&wit-id=2918.
101. See CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 2, at 11-12.
102. Powell, 395 U.S. at 550; U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 783.
103. S. Res. 419, 108th Cong. (2004) (Senator Cornyn's proposal); S. 2073, 108th Cong.
(2004) (Senator Cornyn's proposal); S. Con. Res. 89, 108th Cong. (2004) (Senator
Cornyn's proposal); S. 148, 108th Cong. (2003) (Senator DeWine's proposal); H.R. 2319,
108th Cong. (2003) (Representative Cox's proposal); H.R. 2749, 108th Cong. (2003)
(Representative Sherman's proposal); see also H.R. 3816, 107th Cong. (2003)
(Representative Sherman's proposal): see also 150 CONG. REC. 58771 (daily ed. July 22,
2004) (statement of Sen. Cornyn).
104. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 13.
105. CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, supra note 2, at 31.
106.

See Calabresi, supra note 13, at 156.
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authorization of congressional

1.071.

legislation to deal with Presidential

succession in Article II should be sufficient.""
Finally, although constitutional scholars across the political spectrum
have long challenged various aspects of the current Presidential
Succession Act as unconstitutional, particularly the placement of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore
of the Senate at the front of the Presidential succession line,"' to date
there has not been political interest in changing that law." This may be
because a political party usually does not willingly give up power. But
because we are currently in a situation of unified government (with the
same party controlling both the White House and a majority of both the
House and the Senate), perhaps we are now operating in an era in which
both the Speaker and the Senate President pro tempore would at least
consider giving up their place in the Presidential succession line.
III. CONCLUSION
These are just the thoughts of one observer of the congressional
debate over continuity of government. It is a great honor to be a part of
that debate, and to be a part of this symposium. In the post-9/11 world,
after all, these issues could not be more important. As Senator Cornyn
stated before the Senate Judiciary Committee:
Twenty years ago, after nearly killing Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher and leading members of her government, IRA
terrorists issued a chilling threat: "Remember, we only have to
be lucky once. You have to be lucky always." The American
people should not have to rely on luck. They deserve a
constitutional system of government that is fail-safe and
foolproof. Nobody likes to plan for his own demise, but failure
to do so is not an option. We must plan for the unthinkable
now-before our luck ever runs out. 10
107. Amar & Amar, supra note 13, at 128-29 (discussing difficulties of the Twenty-fifth
Amendment); see also Calabresi, supra note 13, at 175.
108. See sources cited supra note 13.
109. Norman J. Ornstein, It's Armageddon: Who's in Charge Here?, FORTUNE, Feb. 9,
2004, at 53-54.
110. Constitutional Amendment Hearing, supra note 24 (statement of Sen. Cornyn),
http://judiciary.senate.gov/memberstatement.cfm?id=1022&wit-id=2047;
see also Jo
Thomas, This Time, the I.R.A. Comes Close to Thatcher, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1984, at 4.
As The New York Times reported twenty years ago:
The Irish Republican Army claimed responsibility for the bomb that wrecked the
Grand Hotel in Brighton, killing at least three people, injuring a Cabinet
Minister and coming close to killing Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and
leading members of her Government .... Millions of breakfast-time television
viewers saw the popular Minister of Trade, Norman Tebbit, bloody and moaning
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in agony, pulled from the rubble of the ocean resort hotel where he had been
buried for four hours, and the Prime Minister, who barely escaped injury, vowing
grim-faced at her Conservative Party's conference that "all attempts to destroy
democracy by terrorism will fail." The I.R.A. seemed to be promising more
trouble to come. "Today we were unlucky," it said, "but remember, we only
have to be lucky once. You have to be lucky always. Give Ireland peace, and
there will be no war."
Id. Thanks to Curtis Gannon for reminding me of this chilling quote.

